subject: Maryland Reckless Driving Manslaughter Failure Obey Traffic Control Unreasonable Speed Conviction Lawyers Attorneys [print this page] Michael Anthony TAYLOR vMichael Anthony TAYLOR v. STATE of Maryland
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
June 7, 1990
In a six-count indictment, defendant was charged with manslaughter by automobile (Count 1), reckless driving (Count 2), negligent driving (Count 3), failure to obey a traffic control device (Count 4), failure to control speed to avoid a collision (Count 5), and unreasonable speed (Count 6). At the conclusion of the evidence and after the court denied defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, the State, over defendant's objection, entered a nolle prosequi to Counts 2, 5, and 6, leaving the jury to ponder only manslaughter, negligent driving, and failure to stop for the light. The jury found him guilty of all three of those offenses, whereupon the court merged the two lesser offenses into the greater and entered judgment on the manslaughter conviction.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in allowing a nolle prosequi of the reckless driving charge?
The Court observed that "the Manslaughter by automobile is a statutory offense. "Every person causing the death of another as the result of the driving, operation or control of an automobile . . . in a grossly negligent manner, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor to be known as 'manslaughter by automobile . . . .'" Case law holds that the element of "gross negligence," for purposes of this statute, requires the showing of a "wanton or reckless disregard for human life." Reckless driving is also a statutory offense. Md.Transp.Code Ann. 21-901.1(a) provides that a person is guilty of reckless driving if he drives a motor vehicle "(1) In wanton or willful disregard for the safety of persons or property; or (2) In a manner that indicates a wanton or willful disregard for the safety of persons or property."
The contrast between the two offenses is evident. Although "wantonness" may be a common element, the object of the disregard is different. The disregard required under art. 27, 388 must be "for human life." The disregard required under 21-901.1(a) may be for less than that -- for the "safety of persons or property." Moreover, 21-901.1(a) does not require a finding that the defendant actually harbored a wanton or willful disregard but permits a conviction on a finding that his manner of driving "indicates" such a disregard. These may be subtle nuances, but they are not unimportant. Even apart from the prospect of a compromise verdict, have rationally convicted him of reckless driving without being required to convict also of manslaughter. Prejudice did accrue, therefore, from the withdrawal of the reckless driving charge. Speed, erratic driving, disregard of the red light, force of impact -- all of these can be taken as evidence of wanton or reckless disregard of human life.
Conclusion:
This court reversed the trial court's judgment allowing a nolle prosequi of the reckless driving charge against defendant and remanded for a new trial on the manslaughter by automobile charge.
Disclaimer:
These summaries are provided by the SRIS Law Group. They represent the firm's unofficial views of the Justices' opinions. The original opinions should be consulted for their authoritative content
